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INTRODUCTION

I

n a recent federal jury trial, an Occupy Wall Street protestor who
suffers from epilepsy sued the City of New York and New York
Police Department (NYPD) officers for excessive force used during
several protests and willful indifference to her medical condition.1 At
one protest, when the plaintiff was standing over her belongings and
chanting, an NYPD sergeant ran toward the plaintiff, picked her up,
twirled her around, and threw her to the ground. She was hospitalized
for a concussion. When she returned to protesting, on crutches, another
sergeant shoved her off her crutches. At another protest, the plaintiff
was arrested for making unreasonable noise in front of the New York
Stock Exchange. In the patrol wagon, she suffered a seizure, but the
officers failed to render any assistance. She was driven to the precinct
rolling around in her own vomit.2
In her opening statement, the City’s attorney portrayed the plaintiff
as a money-grubbing exaggerator and inventor. For example, the City’s
attorney argued,
What we’re here to discuss is what’s not good, and that’s inventing
and exaggerating. That is what plaintiff does. This is what you are
going to learn about in this trial. This is a deliberate attempt to
deceive you and manipulate you into believing that a story exists
where it does not.

To conclude her presentation, the attorney reiterated:
So, despite these multiple incidents . . . this is not a complicated case,
and the reason for that is because there is one common denominator:
There is one plaintiff who invents and exaggerates, and now she
wants you to give her money for those inventions and exaggerations.
You shouldn’t let her deceive you into thinking that there is a story
where there is none, and you should not give her money.3

To rebut this portrayal and to show the plaintiff’s serious
commitment to social justice, the plaintiff’s counsel planned to ask her
1 Third Amended Complaint, Tardif v. City of New York, 344 F. Supp. 3d 579 (S.D.N.Y.
2018) (No. 13-CV-4056), ECF No. 135.
2 Id. at 10–14.
3 Transcript of Record at 51, Tardif v. City of New York, No. 13-CV-4056 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 14, 2018), ECF No. 341.
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background questions about (1) her living situation as a foster mother
to two three-year-old, immigrant children whose mothers were being
detained by ICE at the southern border; (2) her occupation as a signlanguage interpreter for deaf children attending The Lion King; and
(3) her training and volunteer experience as a nationally certified EMT
who volunteered for local ambulance companies.4 But when the
plaintiff’s attorney tried to broach these topics, the judge sustained all
the City’s objections. At a sidebar the judge told the plaintiff’s
attorney:
From my rulings you may have noticed that I don’t want you to elicit
anything that plays upon the sympathy of jurors. I also want to get
right to the heart of matters . . . . Where she lives, who she lives with,
that she has foster children, none of that should come in. You need to
get to the events of those days [of the protests].5

The plaintiff’s attorney made an offer of proof of the background
evidence she wished to present, but the judge did not reconsider her
decision.6
***
To the court in the Occupy Wall Street case, the “heart of the matter”
was limited solely to the events of the alleged abuse at the protests and
medical indifference. The context of these events—the broader story of
the plaintiff as a person and what brought her to these protests—was to
the court merely a ploy to “play upon the sympathy of the jurors.” To
the plaintiff’s attorney, on the other hand, that deeper story was
essential to understanding the events at issue in the case. In the
defendants’ narrative, the plaintiff was a shallow manipulator who
raised a ruckus at the New York Stock Exchange for the fun of it and
brought the case to cash in. Under the plaintiff’s narrative, she
protested real injustice and brought the case to vindicate her social
justice values. Evidence of where she lived, whom she lived with, and
where she worked were all relevant because they supported her
explanations of the events and undermined the defendants’
explanations. Yet the court prevented the jurors from hearing all of this
contextual evidence.
By contrast, in the early common law, courts were not so wary
of witness storytelling. In fact, those courts were very open to narrative

4 Transcript of Record at 730–31, Tardif v. City of New York, No. 13-CV-4056
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2018), ECF No. 347.
5 Id. at 605.
6 Id. at 730–31.
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in witness testimony.7 As the great evidence scholar John Henry
Wigmore put it, storytelling was the “natural way of giving
testimony.”8 Nevertheless, courts in the early twentieth century began
to limit testimony to evidence that was “logically probative” to the
elements at issue in a case.9 By the mid-twentieth century, this practice
was codified in rules, limiting testimony to evidence that was “logically
relevant” to a case.10 Reflecting this trend, the dominant model for
examining issues of relevancy—the probabilistic paradigm—focuses
almost exclusively on “likelihood ratios” of whether an item of
evidence will support or undermine a proposition in dispute in the
case.11 We are now a far cry from the witness storytelling of the early
common law.
Even as evidentiary rules have impeded storytelling in testimony,
empirical research in the late twentieth century has demonstrated the
significant role of stories in the legal decision-making process.12 Those
studies have shown that jurors instinctively construct stories from the
trial evidence in making their decisions, weighing the comparative
credibility of the competing narratives.13 These findings are supported
by other cognitive science studies recognizing stories as essential
ingredients in human interaction and a primary form of human
communication.14 Relying on this research and insights from narrative
theorists, filmmakers, and neuroscientists,15 scholars in the new field
7

See infra text accompanying notes 19–31.
2 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 767, at 49 (2d ed. 1923); see infra text
accompanying note 31.
9 See infra text accompanying notes 33–35.
10 See infra text accompanying notes 37–52.
11 See infra text accompanying note 55.
12 See, e.g., W. LANCE BENNETT & MARTHA S. FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING REALITY
IN THE COURTROOM: JUSTICE AND JUDGMENT IN AMERICAN CULTURE (Quid Pro Books
2d ed. 2016); Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision
Making: The Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519 (1991).
13 See, e.g., BENNETT & FELDMAN, supra note 12, at 88–90; Pennington & Hastie, supra
note 12, at 522–23.
14 Ruth Anne Robbins, An Introduction to Applied Storytelling and to This Symposium,
14 LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 3, 6 (2008); see infra text accompanying note
81.
15 RICHARD K. SHERWIN, WHEN LAW GOES POP: THE VANISHING LINE BETWEEN LAW
AND POPULAR CULTURE (2000); Gerald P. Lopez, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1, 15
(1984); Philip N. Meyer, “Desperate For Love”: Cinematic Influences upon a Defendant’s
Closing Argument to a Jury, 18 VT. L. REV. 721 (1994). While the field of law and literature
researches some of the same issues as Applied Legal Storytelling, its focus is on
understanding legal texts using the methods of literary interpretation, critique, or analysis or
understanding enduring legal issues in literary texts. Applied Legal Storytelling, on the other
8
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of Applied Legal Storytelling (ALS) have considered the role of
narrative in brief-writing, trial presentation, and judicial opinions.16
They have proposed methods for effective storytelling not only in
litigation but also in transactional work, regulatory policy-making, and
legislative advocacy.17 And they have addressed the importance of
narrative in law school teaching—not only in experiential courses but
also in traditional doctrinal subjects.18
But these scholars have paid little attention to the interplay between
narrative method and the evidentiary rules that regulate the presentation
of a case at trial. While many scholars tout the significance of
storytelling in presenting a persuasive case, they have not considered
the roles that the relevancy rules play in inhibiting and facilitating the
storytelling process. Nor have they addressed how procedural and
evidentiary rules have affected the presentation of narratives in the
modern trial system. Simply put, these scholars have failed to confront
the theories underlying the probabilistic paradigm.
In this context, we will address the relationship between the rules of
relevancy and narrative theory. We will first describe the role of
storytelling in the common law of relevancy and the rise and
widespread adoption of the probabilistic model of proof—a turn to
logic that is seen as culminating in Federal Rule of Evidence 401. We
will then address criticism of the probabilistic paradigm and its main
alternative, the explanatory paradigm. The explanatory paradigm
builds on insights from cognitive science and the theory of Inference to
hand, examines the actual use of storytelling and narrative methods in practice. Robbins,
supra note 14, at 8–12.
16 See, e.g., Todd A. Berger, A Trial Attorney’s Dilemma: How Storytelling as a Trial
Strategy Can Impact the Criminal Defendant’s Successful Appellate Review, 4 DREXEL L.
REV. 297 (2012); Kenneth D. Chestek, The Plot Thickens: The Appellate Brief as Story, 14
LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 127 (2008); Michael J. Higdon, Something
Judicious This Way Comes . . . The Use of Foreshadowing as a Persuasive Device in
Judicial Narrative, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 1213 (2010).
17 See, e.g., Stacy Caplow, Putting the “I” in Wr*t*ng: Drafting an A/Effective Personal
Statement to Tell a Winning Refugee Story, 14 LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST.
249 (2008); Clare Keefe Coleman, Dangerous Tongues: Storytelling in Congressional
Testimony and an Evidence-Based Solution, 19 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 291, 293
(2016); Karen J. Sneddon, The Will as Personal Narrative, 20 ELDER L.J. 355 (2013).
18 Michael Blissenden, Using Storytelling as a Teaching Model in a Law School: The
Experience in an Australian Context, 41 LAW TCHR. 260 (2007); Scott DeVito, The Power
of Stories and Images in Law School Teaching, 53 WASHBURN L.J. 51 (2013); Laurie
Shanks, Whose Story Is It, Anyway? Guiding Students to Client-Centered Interviewing
Through Storytelling, 14 CLINICAL L. REV. 509 (2008); Jo A. Tyler & Faith Mullen, Telling
Tales in School: Storytelling for Self-Reflection and Pedagogical Improvement in Clinical
Legal Education, 18 CLINICAL L. REV. 283 (2011).
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the Best Explanation, and it offers an effective critique of deciding
admissibility based on probabilistic formulas. But the proponents of the
explanatory paradigm do not address how their formula should be
applied in courtrooms. That is where ALS comes in. After outlining the
key insights in this area, we address the overlaps between ALS and the
explanatory paradigm. We then use ALS’s insights to provide guidance
for applying the explanatory paradigm in determining issues of
relevancy. Finally, we circle back to Rule 401 and show how the
seemingly ultrarational approach masks a narrative-friendly model for
determining relevancy—one that can be understood through the lens of
ALS.
I
THE RISE OF THE PROBABILISTIC PARADIGM
A. The Common Law’s Embrace of Storytelling
The reported cases and commentaries indicate that early common
law judges and lawyers welcomed narratives in witness testimony.
They considered witness narratives the preferred method for presenting
a witness’s version of the events. A good example is a reported case
from 1704 of an alleged assault by Nathaniel Denew against William
Colepeper.19 The prosecution called the victim’s sister as a witness
concerning the alleged assault by Denew against her brother. The
prosecutor asked her, “Pray, madam, will you be pleased to acquaint
my lord and the jury what you know concerning this matter, and what
passed between your brother, Mr. Colepeper, and Mr. Denew, at his
first coming to him?”20 No objection is noted by the reporter, and the
sister answered.21
It appears this mode of examination was the common practice for at
least the next two centuries in both England and America.22 In 1795,
Zephaniah Swift, a noted Connecticut lawyer who later became a
congressman, observed in one of his many digests of the law: “In the
examination of witnesses admitted to testify, the proper mode is
to permit them in the first place to tell their stories in their own
19

The Trial of Nathaniel Denew, et al., in A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS
PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH TREASON & OTHER CRIMES & MISDEMEANORS 895 (T.B.
Howell ed. 1812).
20 Id. at 916.
21 Id.
22 See generally Arthur E. Howard Jr., Why Can’t I Tell My Story, 26 CONN. BAR J. 183
(1952).

AND
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language.”23 And in 1835, prominent lawyer Joseph Chitty observed in
one of the earliest legal practitioners’ texts in England:
It is certainly the practice, when the time and place of the scene
of action have once been fixed, to desire the witness to give his own
account of the matter, directing him, when not a professional person,
to omit as he proceeds any account of what he has only heard from
others, and not seen or heard himself . . . . It is difficult, therefore, to
extract the important parts of his evidence piecemeal, but if his
attention be first drawn to the transaction, by asking him when and
where it happened, and he be told to describe it from the beginning,
he will generally proceed in his own way to detail all the facts in the
due order of time.24

At least until the late nineteenth century, most courts seemed very
open to direct examination questions asking witnesses to tell their
stories. One of the most noted American cases on the issue is Northern
Pacific Railroad Co. v. Charless, an 1892 decision from the Ninth
Circuit.25 In that case, a railroad employee brought a personal injury
action against his employer.26 The plaintiff’s lawyer called the
employee as a witness, asked him a few preliminary questions, and then
asked, “Turn to the jury, and tell them the facts of the case,
commencing at the time of your employment with the Northern Pacific
Railroad Company, and tell them the complete story.”27 The defendant
did not initially object, but later objected on relevancy and hearsay
grounds when, after the plaintiff began describing his employment and
duties, he began to describe the incident.28 The trial court overruled the
objection.29 On appeal, the defendant argued that because plaintiff’s
testimony was given in narrative form, it had no opportunity to
object.30 Citing Joseph Chitty, the court affirmed and held
that the taking of the witness’ testimony in the narrative form would
be the best way of getting at what he knew or could state concerning
the matter at issue; [and] that it would save time to proceed in that

23 1 ZEPHANIAH SWIFT, DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 748
(New Haven, S. Converse 1822).
24 3 JOSEPH CHITTY, THE PRACTICE OF LAW IN ALL ITS DEPARTMENTS 894 (London,
S. Sweet, Stevens & Sons, A. Maxwell 1835).
25 N. Pac. R.R. Co. v. Charless, 51 F. 562 (9th Cir. 1892).
26 Id.
27 Id. at 570 (emphasis added).
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id.
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way, and would perhaps furnish to the jury a more connected
statement of the matter to be told as it occurred and took place.31

The court recognized, however, that when a witness gives testimony
that is irrelevant, immaterial, or hearsay, the opposing party can object,
and the inadmissible testimony can be stricken.32
Accordingly, while the common law practice through the late
nineteenth century recognized evidentiary rules of relevancy, it also
realized the significance of context in a witness’s recounting of
events—echoing the court’s holding in Northern Pacific Railroad
connecting the witness’s individual observations into a narrative.
B. The Rationalist Takeover
Story soon fell out of the picture when it came to relevancy. At the
end of the nineteenth century, Harvard Law professor James Bradley
Thayer published his classic treatise calling for “a rational system of
evidence . . . which forbids receiving anything irrelevant [in evidence],
not logically probative.”33 As Thayer put it,
In the pressure of actual trials, where, often, the interests and passions
of men are deeply stirred and all the resources of chicane are called
into play and directed by great abilities to obstruct the movements
of justice, []the rules of evidence and procedure ought to be in a
shape to . . . prompt[] the authority of the courts in checking these
familiar efforts. . . . [T]wo leading principles should be brought into
conspicuous relief, (1) that nothing is to be received which is not
logically probative of some matter requiring to be proved; and
(2) that everything which is thus probative should come in, unless a
clear ground of policy or law excludes it.34

This focus on logical probativeness affected the practice of witness
examination.35 Lawyers and judges became irrationally fearful of
31

Id. at 570–71 (emphasis added).
Id.
33 JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE
COMMON LAW 265 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1898).
34 Id. at 530.
35 It is unclear from contemporaneous commentaries whether Thayer’s treatise effected
the change from a storytelling to a question-and-answer format, whether the treatise only
reflected the changes in the actual practice at the time, or whether this transformation was a
combination of both. Interestingly, in Wigmore’s 1904 evidence treatise, published a few
years after Thayer’s, he does not even address the format of witness examination. See
1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE AT COMMON LAW
(1st ed. 1904). Two decades later, however, in the second edition of his treatise, Wigmore
notes this development in the format of witness examination and criticizes it. 2 WIGMORE,
supra note 8, at 49.
32
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any evidence that might taint the record in the least bit. As a result,
the practice of lawyer control of examination through discrete
questions and answers—rather than the former practice of open-ended
storytelling—became the prevailing method of direct examination. As
another giant in evidence scholarship, John Henry Wigmore, wrote,
“This [changed] practice is due largely to the increase of technicality
in rulings of inadmissibility on the pettiest of details of testimony.
There is in the mind of courts and practitioners an obsession that the
natural way of giving testimony [storytelling] is the dangerous way.”36
Starting in the 1930s, evidence scholars, lawyers, and jurists began
to codify the common law rules of evidence, making changes as they
went. In the process, they further increased the technicality in rulings
on evidence admissibility and further distanced themselves from the
common law method of giving testimony.
In 1939, in an attempt to not only organize but also revise the
common law rules of evidence, the American Law Institute set out to
prepare the Model Code of Evidence (the “Model Code”).37 Following
in Thayer’s footsteps, the adopted code defined “relevant evidence” as
“evidence having any tendency in reason to prove [any material
matter].”38 The commentary to the provision states that “[r]elevant
evidence is evidence having any value in reason as tending to prove
any matter provable in an action.”39
While the drafters of the Model Code never fleshed out the meaning
of “any value in reason,” it is perhaps no coincidence that at the same
time as the adoption of the Code, George F. James published his classic
article articulating modern relevancy theory, “Relevancy, Probability

36 2 WIGMORE, supra note 8, at 49. Wigmore recognized that continuous narration by
the witness has “the disadvantage of risking the witness’ interjection of irrelevant and
inadmissible matter (chiefly hearsay) without any opportunity for the opponent to know
beforehand in time to object and prevent it,” but suggested that the trial court, in its
discretion, could control the format of witness examination to address that problem. Id.
Clearly, though, he preferred witness storytelling, noting, “It is obvious that this method . . .
has . . . the advantage of preserving continuity . . . of thought for the witness himself and of
saving time for all parties concerned.” Id. at 48.
37 MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE intro. at ix (AM. L. INST. 1942).
38 Id. r. 1(12) (emphasis added). While the preliminary drafts of the Code defined
“Relevant Evidence” as “evidence having probative value upon any material fact,” later
drafts replaced the language “probative value” with “tendency in reason.” Compare MODEL
CODE OF EVIDENCE r. 1(10) (AM. L. INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 1940) with MODEL CODE
OF EVIDENCE r. 1(10) (AM. L. INST., Preliminary Draft No. 15, 1941). No explanation is
provided in the Preliminary Draft No. 15 for the handwritten change of terminology.
39 MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE r. 1 cmt. 12 (AM. L. INST. 1942).
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and the Law.”40 In this article, James grounded the Model Code’s
treatment of relevancy in Thayer’s interpretation of the common law of
evidence as a rational system.41 Then, he articulated his conception of
the nature of relevancy in such a rational system:
[E]vidence is relevant if it can be demonstrated, in terms of some
generalization acceptable to the court, to alter the apparent
probability of any material proposition in the case. The
generalization may rest either upon the general experience of the
court or upon expert testimony, but it should be susceptible of
expression.42

This formulation—what James called “logical relevancy”—is the
quasi-syllogistic testing of the value of any proffered evidence by the
probability of the major premise.43 James provided this concrete
example of his conception:
Persons who are unwilling to agree that men’s fixed designs (at least
in case of murder) are “probably” carried out—or, even conceding
the fact of murder, that proof of A’s fixed design to kill B establishes
A, more likely than not, as B’s killer—still agree that somehow this
bit of evidence does have some tendency to indicate A’s guilt.44

Consistent with James’s formulation of probative value, under the
probabilistic paradigm, relevance of a particular item of evidence
depends on whether it changes the probability of a proposition in
dispute. Relevance is expressed in terms of a likelihood ratio:
P(E|H)
P(E|not H)
where P is the probative value, E is the item of evidence, the vertical
bar means given, and H is the hypothesis.45 A likelihood ratio of oneto-one means that the evidence is irrelevant. “[E]vidence is logically
relevant only when the probability of finding that evidence given the
truth of some hypothesis at issue in the case differs from the probability
of finding the same evidence given the falsity of the hypothesis at
issue.”46 Any likelihood ratio other than one-to-one means that the
evidence is relevant. If the ratio is greater than one-to-one, then the
40

George F. James, Relevancy, Probability and the Law, 29 CALIF. L. REV. 689 (1941).
Id.
42 Id. at 704 (emphasis added).
43 See id. at 698–99.
44 Id.
45 See Richard O. Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1021, 1025 (1977);
1 KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 185, at 1109–10 (8th ed. 2020).
46 Lempert, supra note 45, at 1026.
41
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evidence is relevant to prove a proposition. If the ratio is lower than
one-to-one, then the evidence is relevant for disproving the proposition.
The larger the disparity of the antecedent and consequent in the ratio,
the more strongly the evidence either supports or undermines the
proposition.
Consider the following concrete example: in an assault case, if the
judge hypothesizes that a person with a nonviolent reputation is not
likely to commit assaults, evidence of such a reputation is relevant. The
likelihood ratio is more than one: given the hypothesis, it is less likely
than not that the defendant committed the assault in this case. If, on the
other hand, the judge hypothesizes that persons with nonviolent
reputations are just as likely to commit assaults as those with violent
reputations, the likelihood ratio is one-to-one, and the evidence of the
defendant’s nonviolent reputation is not probative and is accordingly
irrelevant.47
Under the probabilistic conception, then, evidence must be
quantified in some manner to determine its probative value.48
Quantification of individual items of evidence may be based on
objective or subjective considerations. In some cases, courts might
consult objective factors, like relative frequencies or known statistical
distributions. In other cases, the court might consider subjective factors
based on degrees of belief or how strongly the judge believes the
evidence “fits” with the underlying hypothesis.
The “tendency in reason” approach of the Model Code and George
F. James made its way into the next major codification of evidence law,
the Uniform Rules of Evidence (the “Uniform Rules”), which the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the
American Bar Association adopted in 1953.49 Like the Model Code,
the Uniform Rules defined “relevant evidence” as “evidence having
any tendency in reason to prove any material fact.”50 And then, echoing
James, the Uniform Rules defined “proof” as “all of the evidence
before the trier of the fact relevant to a fact in issue which tends to
prove the existence or non-existence of such fact.”51 The comments to
the Uniform Rules made explicit James’s formulation of logical
relevancy. They provide that
47

BROUN ET AL., supra note 45 § 185, at 1108–09.
Michael S. Pardo, The Paradoxes of Legal Proof: A Critical Guide, 99 B.U. L. REV.
233, 247–48 (2019).
49 UNIF. R. EVID. 1(2) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1953).
50 Id.
51 Id. R. 1(3).
48
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[t]he only test of relevancy is logic. With this simple statement we
must be content. Nothing could be gained in a code of rules by
making it a thesis on the subject of logic. The courts will have to
continue to decide what inferences might reasonably be drawn from
knowledge or from perception in or outside of the court room on the
basis of common sense.52

C. Rule 401 and the Probabilistic Paradigm
The definition of relevancy in the next major codification, the
Federal Rules of Evidence (“the Federal Rules”), adopted in 1975,
appears to follow in its predecessors’ footsteps.53 Rule 401 of the
Federal Rules provides that evidence is relevant if: “(a) it has any
tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without
the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the
action.”54
The language of probability in Rule 401 appears to adopt James’s
logical relevancy theory. And in fact, the Advisory Committee Notes
cite James for the proposition that the test is whether “the item of
evidence tend[s] to prove the matter sought to be proved.”55
Rule 401, however, reflects some nuance in its embrace of the
probabilistic paradigm. The rule as adopted uses “tendency,” instead of
“tendency in reason.”56 And the Advisory Committee Notes soften the
rule’s formulation somewhat:
The fact to which the evidence is directed need not be in dispute.
While situations will arise which call for the exclusion of evidence
offered to prove a point conceded by the opponent, the ruling should
be made on the basis of such considerations as waste of time and
undue prejudice (see Rule 403), rather than under any general
requirement that evidence is admissible only if directed to matters in
dispute. Evidence which is essentially background in nature can
52

Id. R. 1 cmt. subdiv. 2.
As we will later demonstrate, the history of the rules supports a broader reading of the
relevancy definition than strict “logical relevancy.” See infra text accompanying notes 173–
74.
54 FED. R. EVID. 401; see also FED. R. EVID. 403 (providing “[t]he court may exclude
relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or
more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue
delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence”).
55 FED. R. EVID. 401 advisory committee’s note. Indeed, in the first draft of the rules,
the Reporter noted, “The approach to relevancy here adopted is based on [James’s article].
It has been followed by most of the subsequent writers on the subject.” Reporter’s
Memorandum on Relevancy and Its Limits, at 1–2 [hereinafter First Draft], https://www
.law.umich.edu/facultyhome/richardfriedman/Documents/5.%20Art%204%201st%20draft
.pdf [https://perma.cc/DUA2-QUU2] (last visited May 7, 2020).
56 See infra text accompanying notes 173–74.
53
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scarcely be said to involve disputed matter, yet it is universally
offered and admitted as an aid to understanding. Charts,
photographs, views of real estate, murder weapons, and many other
items of evidence fall in this category. A rule limiting admissibility
to evidence directed to a controversial point would invite the
exclusion of this helpful evidence, or at least the raising of endless
questions over its admission.57

This language reflects the position of Charles McCormick in his 1954
Handbook of the Law of Evidence:
In addition [to evidence that bears directly on the issues] . . . lee-way
is allowed even on direct examination for proof of facts which are not
really offered as bearing on the dispute . . . but merely as details
which fill in the background of the narrative and give it interest, color
and life-likeness.58

But even this passing acceptance of the relevancy of background
evidence was subject to harsh criticism by scholars with a more
technical bent. After the Federal Rules were adopted, Professor Olin
Guy Wellborn severely criticized the Advisory Committee and
McCormick. Noting that neither had cited any case or authority for
their propositions about background evidence, he argued, “This is
questionable doctrine. . . . [I]t undercuts Thayer’s first principle—‘a
presupposition involved in the very conception of a rational system of
evidence’—that matters irrelevant in the usual sense, ‘not bearing on
the dispute, however defined,’ may not be received.”59

57

FED. R. EVID. 401 advisory committee’s note (emphasis added).
CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 152, at 315 (1st
ed. 1954) (emphasis added). In the second edition of the handbook, edited by Edward
Cleary, the Reporter for the Advisory Committee, this passage cites approvingly to the
Advisory Committee Notes on Rule 401. MCCORMICK’S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE § 185, at 434 n.7 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 2d ed. 1972).
59 Olin Guy Wellborn III, The Federal Rules of Evidence and the Application of State
Law in the Federal Courts, 55 TEX. L. REV. 371, 382 (1977) (citation omitted). Wellborn
continues,
[McCormick’s position] is a superfluity that inherently tends, if recognized, to
restrict the legitimate reach of relevancy as ordinarily conceived; a properly
expansive concept of logical relevancy encompasses evidence of the kind
McCormick described, and a conception that excludes it is too narrow. Evidence
need not itself be in dispute in order to bear on a disputed matter in important ways.
Much evidence bearing on the credibility of witnesses is of this nature. Even
matters such as a witness’ name, address, and occupation—“identifying the
witness with his environment”—are clearly encompassed within the basic
definition of relevancy; they are simply one step further away in a chain of
inferences from the disputed facts that the proponent seeks to prove or to disprove.
Id. at 382–83 (citations omitted).
58
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And Thomas F. Green Jr., a member of the Advisory Committee,
offered words of caution about the broad approval of background
evidence in the McCormick hornbook in an article published before the
adoption of the Federal Rules.60 Like Wellborn, Green noted that
McCormick lacked cited authority for his assertion that “considerable
leeway is allowed for proof of facts that are not really offered as bearing
on the dispute.”61 Then, while acknowledging that courts have
admitted evidence merely to add interest and color to the narrative even
on direct examination, he wondered aloud if such admission was
permitted simply because no objection has been made or because it
“enable[s] the trier of fact to interpret the testimony in the light of the
environment of the witnesses.”62
Currently, the major evidence treatises, while recognizing in passing
some nuance in the interpretation of the relevancy rules, address the
issue of probative value through the probabilistic paradigm. For
example, the McCormick treatise frames its discussion of the issue
around deductive and inductive formulae for assessing likelihood
ratios.63 Similarly, the Mueller and Kirkpatrick treatise, while
eschewing “any suggestion that probative worth is a matter to be
gauged with computer-like precision,” turns around and approvingly
cites James’s analysis because “it exposes the whole reasoning process
to closer scrutiny and better understanding of [the hypotheses’] strength
or weakness.”64 And the Weinstein treatise posits that “[t]he question
to be asked in determining the relevance of evidence is whether a
reasonable person might believe the probability of the truth of the
consequential fact to be different if that person knew of the proffered
evidence.”65 The authoritative treatises thus urge the use of the
probabilistic paradigm to determine relevancy.

60 Thomas F. Green Jr., Relevancy and Its Limits, 1969 LAW & SOC. ORDER 533, 536
n.21 (quoting CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 152, at
315 (1st ed. 1954)).
61 Id.
62 Id. (citing Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687 (1931) (holding that the defense could
cross-examine a government witness about the fact that he lived in a jail)). The question, the
Court held, was “an essential step in identifying the witness with his environment, to which
cross-examination may always be directed.” Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 693
(1931).
63 BROUN ET AL., supra note 45, at 396.
64 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 4:2
(4th ed. 2013).
65 2 JACK B. WEINSTEIN, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 401.04(2)(b) (2020).

2020]

Storytelling and Relevancy

177

II
THE EXPLANATORY PARADIGM:
AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE PROBABILISTIC PARADIGM
While scholarly literature has long considered the probabilistic
paradigm to be the dominant theoretical account for assessing probative
value,66 narrative has always lurked on the edges of evidence law. This
role of narrative can be seen in the acknowledgment of background
evidence in the notes on Rule 401.67 And though treatises recite the
likelihood ratio, they must acknowledge the origins of evidence law,
which favored narrative. Professor Wigmore sounded almost nostalgic
writing that “[a] healthy view of the subject would banish the obsession
[with logic], and would restore the natural method as the usual one,
thus obtaining more reliable testimony and a notable economy of time
in trials.”68
And there are obvious workability problems with the likelihood
ratio. The claim that courts practice the probabilistic paradigm seems
to ignore the fact that few judges actually methodically calculate
likelihood ratios in considering a relevancy objection.69 Such
mathematical precision is simply impossible in the rough and tumble
of trials. But the probabilistic paradigm does affect the minds of many
judges in their rulings on relevancy objections. In the hurry of
litigation, many judges adopt a conservative approach, counter to the
general rule in favor of admissibility under Rule 401. They require a
precise connection between evidence and a particular element in the
case or a defense.70 While these judges do not use slide rules or
66 Michael S. Pardo, The Nature and Purpose of Evidence Theory, 66 VAND. L. REV.
547 (2013).
67 See supra text accompanying notes 57–58.
68 2 WIGMORE, supra note 8, at 49.
69 A review of the state and federal databases in Westlaw discloses that such an analysis
has only been used in reported cases in the context of examining the probative value of
expert testimony, primarily DNA testing. See, e.g., United States v. Lewis, 442 F. Supp. 3d
1122, 1126 (D. Minn. 2020) (expert testimony as to likelihood ratios provided “extremely
strong support” for admission of DNA evidence); United States v. Allison, 63 M.J. 365, 369
(C.A.A.F. 2006) (citation omitted) (holding that “evidence of statistical probabilities is not
only ‘basic to DNA analysis,’ but also essential to the admissibility of that analysis”); Ivey
v. Commonwealth, 486 S.W.3d 846, 859 (Ky. 2016) (Venters, J., concurring) (in a case
concerning DNA testing, concurring justice notes, “[t]he likelihood ratio, by itself, is a
probability-based method for evaluating the probative value of forensic evidence . . . .”).
70 See generally State v. Fasano, 868 A.2d 79, 94 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005) (citation
omitted) (holding that “the relevance of an offer of evidence must be assessed against the
elements of the cause of action, crime, or defenses at issue in the trial. The connection to an
element need not be direct, so long as it exists. Once a witness has testified to certain facts,
for example, his credibility is ‘a fact that is of consequence to [or material to] the
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calculators to determine likelihood ratios, they semiautomatically
estimate those ratios using the probabilistic schema. In the police abuse
case discussed in the Introduction, for example, the court almost
instinctively determined that the probative value of plaintiff’s family
and occupation background was nil because her background was not in
dispute.71 The likelihood of the elements of any proposition underlying
her claim, the court decided, was not affected one way or the other by
that evidence.72
But what should the probabilistic paradigm be replaced with? In the
last two decades, legal scholarship has taken cues from cognitive
science and philosophy and has come upon an alternative to the
probabilistic paradigm. This approach, most exemplified by Ronald
Allen and Michael Pardo, is the explanatory paradigm.
A. Stories in Cognitive Science and Jury Decision-Making Literature
Recent cognitive science research calls into question a purely
probabilistic model in determining probative value. Cognitive
scientists have found that when faced with incomplete evidence about
the causation of particular situations or conditions, individuals do not
simply engage in abstract statistical reasoning to draw inferences but
seek explanations based on prior beliefs about similar phenomena.73

determination of the action,’ and evidence relating to his credibility is therefore relevant—
but only if the facts to which the witness has already testified are themselves relevant to an
element of a crime, cause of action, or defense in the case.”); Esparza v. State, 513 S.W.3d
643, 647 (Tex. App. 2016) (affirming exclusion of evidence of the complainant’s bias in an
indecency with child case because the defendant “failed to establish relevancy or the logical
nexus required to demonstrate bias”); State v. Suarez-Bravo, 864 P.2d 426, 430 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1994) (in prosecution for unlawful possession with intent to deliver cocaine, court
holds that evidence that defendant’s apartment building was in a high crime area was
irrelevant because it “[had] no logical relevancy to any element of the charge against”
defendant and rejecting prosecution’s explanation that the evidence showed how unusual it
was for defendant to allow strangers to come to his door).
71 See Transcript of Record at 605, Tardif v. City of New York, No. 13-CV-4056
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2018), ECF No. 347 (court indicating that the only issues in dispute
were the events surrounding the protests).
72 See supra text accompanying notes 1–6.
73 See Tania Lombrozo, Explanation and Abductive Inference, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF THINKING AND REASONING 1, 15 (Keith J. Holyoak & Robert G. Morrison
eds., 2012), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/49ca/ff587dc7e08913eed9acf407bd3d4db7e
363.pdf [https://perma.cc/CQM9-DYLV]; Tania Lombrozo, The Structure and Function of
Explanations, 10 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCIS. 464, 465 (2006).
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The factors that affect an explanation’s perceived quality include
simplicity, breadth, coherence, and beliefs about causal mechanisms.74
Nancy Pennington and Reid Hastie have made similar findings in
the context of jury decision-making.75 In their research, they found that
jurors begin their decision-making process by constructing a
narrative to explain the available facts they have heard at trial. The
distinctive assumption in our explanation-based approach to decision
making is the hypothesis that decision makers construct an
intermediate summary of the evidence and that this explanation,
rather than the original “raw” evidence, is the basis of the final
decision.76

This explanation-based decision-making framework, or Story Model,
posits that jurors develop stories to explain the evidence rather than
assess individual items of evidence in the abstract. As Lance Bennett
and Martha Feldman concluded in their studies of jury decisionmaking,
[w]hat makes a particular fact or bit of evidence take on meaning in
a case is not its physical form, the credibility of the witness who
introduced it, or the corroborating testimony of several witnesses.
These things all play important roles when [jurors] weigh evidence
and assess its reliability, but they do not determine its significance.
What makes a fact or piece of evidence meaningful in a particular
case is its contextual role in the stories that make up the case.77

Pennington and Hastie’s Story Model comports with the research
of pioneering cognitive scientist Jerome Bruner on the cognitive
process. Bruner asserts, “There are two modes of cognitive functioning,
two modes of thought, each providing distinctive ways of ordering
experience, of constructing reality.”78 The first mode—the
“paradigmatic or logico-scientific” mode—“attempts to fulfill the ideal
of a formal, mathematical system of description and explanation. . . .
[G]eneral propositions are extracted from statements in their particular
74 See Lombrozo, Explanation and Abductive Inference, supra note 73; Lombrozo, The
Structure and Function of Explanations, supra note 73.
75 See Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, The O.J. Simpson Stories: Behavioral
Scientists’ Reflections on The People of the State of California v. Orenthal James Simpson,
67 U. COLO. L. REV. 957 (1996) [hereinafter Pennington & Hastie, The O.J. Simpson
Stories]; Pennington & Hastie, supra note 12; Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Evidence
Evaluation in Complex Decision Making, 51 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 242 (1986).
76 Pennington & Hastie, The O.J. Simpson Stories, supra note 75, at 959 (emphasis
added). As Allen and Pardo note, Pennington and Hastie’s findings support the explanatory
paradigm for assessing evidence. See Pardo, supra note 66, at 552.
77 BENNETT & FELDMAN, supra note 12, at 117.
78 JEROME BRUNER, ACTUAL MINDS, POSSIBLE WORLDS 11 (1986).
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contexts[,] . . . [and] [i]ts domain . . . is driven by principled
hypotheses.”79 This mode “seeks to transcend the particular by higher
and higher reaching for abstraction, and in the end disclaims in
principle any explanatory value at all where the particular is
concerned.”80
In contrast to the paradigmatic mode of thinking, the second mode
of thought—narrative thinking—recognizes the explanatory value of
the particular:
Narrative . . . differs from purely logical [thinking] in that it takes for
granted that the puzzling problems with which it deals do not have a
single “right” solution—one and only one answer that is logically
permissible. It takes for granted, too, that a set of contested events
can be organized into alternative narratives and that a choice between
them may depend upon perspective, circumstances, interpretative
frameworks.81

While this cognitive science research does not totally discount the
paradigmatic mode’s importance and the evaluation of the probative
value of evidence through the probabilistic model of proof, it
demonstrates the significant role that stories play in the cognitive
process. Given the indeterminacy of most evidentiary issues in cases,
this research indicates that the ultimate decision in a case depends in
large part on the quality of the explanations proffered for the
evidence—the stories presented to the fact finder—rather than purely
logical analysis. For that reason, when a court rules on an item of
evidence’s probative value, it would be remiss to focus solely on the
probability that the item proves a particular legal proposition and to
ignore the role that the evidence plays in explaining one party’s overall
story.
B. The Explanatory Paradigm of Proof and Inference to the
Best Explanation
Relying in part on the Pennington and Hastie research, Ronald Allen
and Michael Pardo have developed the explanatory paradigm as an
alternative to the probabilistic conception of proof.82 Rather than
79

Id. at 12–13.
Id. at 13.
81 ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 141 (2000).
82 Allen and Pardo also refer to the conception of relevancy as “relative plausibility.”
See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, Relative Plausibility and Its Critics, 23 INT’L
J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 5 (2019) [hereinafter Allen & Pardo, Relative Plausibility and Its
Critics]; Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, Explanations and the Preponderance
Standard: Still Kicking Rocks with Dr. Johnson, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 1579 (2018)
80

2020]

Storytelling and Relevancy

181

focusing on probability, “the explanatory conception examines whether
particular explanations, if true, would be better or worse at explaining
the evidence and the underlying events than alternative
explanations.”83 The proponents of this model posit that “[j]udgments
on probative value are highly contextual and depend not only on the
logical [and] empirical relationships between evidence and disputed
propositions, but also on the importance of the evidence” in assessing
the explanations of the evidence asserted by the different parties.84
According to the proponents of the explanatory paradigm, the
probabilistic paradigm’s limited focus on quantifying the probative
value of evidence demonstrates the significance of context in
determining probative value.
One example in the context of expert evidence shows the differences
in approach between the probabilistic and explanatory paradigms.
Consider a case in which Child Protective Services (CPS) alleges that
the parents have abused their two-year-old daughter, and CPS presents
evidence that the daughter still wets her bed. If research shows that bedwetting is equally common among both abused and nonabused
children, then the likelihood ratio is one-to-one, and evidence that the
alleged victim wets the bed would not have probative value. If,
however, studies show that bed-wetting is twice as common in abused
children, then the evidence of bed-wetting in this case would have some
probative value.85
Under the probabilistic conception, if research showed that bedwetting is equally common among both abused and nonabused
children, then evidence that the alleged victim wets the bed would not
have probative value since the likelihood ratio would be one-to-one.
But such an analysis can be blinkered by inevitable variation in human
behavior:
Even if the behavior is equally common among both groups of
children, it might nevertheless be highly probative in a given case if,
for example, abused children exhibiting this behavior also possess,
and nonabused children lack, an additional characteristic and the
particular child at issue possesses (or lacks) this characteristic.
Similarly, even if the behavior is one thousand times more likely in
abused children, the probative value may nevertheless be minimal if
[hereinafter Allen & Pardo, Explanations and the Preponderance Standard]; Ronald J.
Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Problematic Value of Mathematical Models of Evidence, 36
J. LEGAL STUD. 107, 136 (2007) [hereinafter Allen & Pardo, The Problematic Value].
83 Pardo, supra note 66, at 596–97.
84 Id. at 564.
85 Id.
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the child possesses (or lacks) an additional characteristic that places
the child in the group of nonabused children who exhibit the
behavior. In these examples, the evidence and the likelihood ratios
remain constant, but the probative value may vary dramatically. A
fortiori, the probative value is not the likelihood ratio.86

Mere quantification, therefore, has its limits.
Unlike under the probabilistic model, the explanatory conception
recognizes the significance of context in regard to undisputed facts. To
illustrate this point, Pardo cites People v. Johnson, a case in which the
defendant, an inmate at a maximum-security prison, was charged with
two counts of battery on prison guards.87 The charges arose from an
altercation between the defendant and guards after the defendant had
refused to return a food tray in his cell.88 The prosecution’s theory was
that the defendant battered the guards when they opened the cell door
to retrieve the tray.89 By contrast, the defendant’s theory was that one
of the guards rushed in and began hitting him first, and that even if he
made contact first with the guard, he was acting in self-defense.90
Multiple witnesses for each side testified to details about a package sent
from defendant’s family that he had not received and about the mail
procedures at the prison.91 Each side used the undisputed evidence of
the nonreceipt of the package to support its own theory of the case. The
defendant argued that he withheld the tray only after repeated,
unsuccessful attempts to speak with a sergeant about the package, and
that the guards attacked him to retaliate or punish him for seeking
answers.92 The prosecutor asserted that the defendant withheld his tray
and charged the guard simply because he was frustrated and angry
about not receiving the package.93
As Pardo argues, under the probabilistic paradigm, the contextual
evidence concerning the prison’s failure to deliver the package has little
or no probative value because both parties can cite it to support their
claims and defenses. Because there is no reason to believe that the
86

Id. at 588.
People v. Johnson is an actual case, a revised transcript of which is included in
RONALD J. ALLEN ET AL., AN ANALYTICAL APPROACH TO EVIDENCE: TEXT, PROBLEMS,
AND CASES 1–84 (6th ed. 2016). The names of all the participants in the case were changed
to provide some anonymity to the parties involved. Id. at 1 n.1.
88 Id. at 37.
89 Id. at 73–75.
90 Id. at 80.
91 See id. at 24, 30, 47, 57.
92 See id. at 58–59.
93 Id. at 73–75.
87
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evidence supports one party’s theory or the other, the likelihood ratio
is one-to-one, and the evidence is likely inadmissible.94
But without this evidence, the jury would have been forced to decide
who started the altercation without being informed of the events
that precipitated it. Under the explanatory paradigm, the evidence
has probative value because it either furthers each side’s overall
explanation of the events or distinguishes between the accounts. This
evidence would allow the jury to determine the best explanation of
what happened—either the prosecution’s or the defendant’s.
While the probabilistic paradigm focuses on drawing inferences
based on quantification of items of evidence, the explanatory paradigm
focuses on drawing inferences about particular items of evidence based
on their role in explaining a party’s version of the events. Accordingly,
analysis of the probative value of evidence under the probabilistic
paradigm requires some measurement, however imprecise, of the
likelihood that the evidence supports or undermines a hypothesis. By
contrast, analysis of the probative value of evidence under the
explanatory paradigm requires an assessment of the relationship of that
evidence to the overall story of the party or its opponent. For the
advocates of the explanatory paradigm, evidence is irrelevant if “the
reasons given about the relationship between the evidence and the
explanation are either false or too speculative. . . . To overcome
relevance objections, parties must provide plausible reasons as to why
the evidence supports or challenges one of the explanations.”95
Allen and Pardo argue that in assessing the “plausibility” of a
particular item of evidence to determine its probative value, courts and
attorneys should look to a philosophical theory: Inference to the Best
Explanation.96 This theory was fully developed by the late Peter
Lipton, a professor at Cambridge University.97 Lipton contends that
when observing an event or condition, “[g]iven our data and our
background beliefs, we infer what would, if true, provide the best of
the competing explanations we can generate [to make sense of] those

94

Pardo, supra note 66, at 581.
Id. at 603. Indeed, some contend that even speculative evidence should be admitted.
See, e.g., David Crump, On the Uses of Irrelevant Evidence, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 26–39
(1997).
96 See, e.g., Pardo, supra note 66, at 597; Allen & Pardo, The Problematic Value, supra
note 82, at 136; Ronald J. Allen, Burdens of Proof, 13 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 195, 216
(2014); Ronald J. Allen, Clarifying the Burden of Persuasion and Bayesian Decision Rules:
A Response to Professor Kaye, 4 INT’L J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 246, 256 (2000).
97 PETER LIPTON, INFERENCE TO THE BEST EXPLANATION (2d ed. 2004).
95
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data.”98 He posits: “[W]e may characterize the best explanation as the
one which would, if correct, be the most explanatory or provide the
most understanding: the ‘loveliest’ explanation.”99
In his writings, Lipton sets forth the factors that impact the loveliness
of an explanation:
1. Mechanism. As Lipton observes, “We understand a
phenomenon better when we know not just what caused it, but how
the cause operated.”100
2. Precision. Lipton also notes that the plausibility of an
explanation of a phenomenon depends not only on an understanding
of its qualitative features but also its quantitative elements.101
3. Scope. For Lipton, an explanation that explains more
phenomena than the key event is the loveliest.102
4. Simplicity. Simple explanations, Lipton argues, “enable us to
achieve one of the cardinal goals of understanding, namely to reveal
the unity that underlies the apparent diversity of the phenomena.”103
5 Fertility or Fruitfulness. Akin to scope and simplicity, Lipton
contends that fertility leads to a clearer understanding of a situation
or condition because it “disclose[s] . . . previously unnoted
relationships among those already known.”104
6. Fit with Background Belief. Finally, Lipton notes that an
individual’s background belief has a significant impact on her
understanding of a situation or phenomenon.105
While Allen and Pardo cite these factors as criteria to consider in
evaluating the probative value of items of evidence in support of an
explanation,106 they provide little guidance on how lawyers and judges
should apply these criteria in practice. They merely observe that “there
is no agreed-upon algorithm or method for combining or ranking the
98

Id. at 56.
Id. at 59. Lipton distinguishes between “likeliest” or most probable explanation. “The
criteria of likeliness and loveliness may well pick out the same explanation in a particular
competition, but they are clearly different sorts of standard[s]. Likeliness speaks of truth;
loveliness of potential understanding.” Id. (emphasis added). This observation succinctly
encapsulates the difference between the probabilistic and explanatory conceptions of
relevance.
100 Id. at 122.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id. (citation omitted).
105 Id.
106 Pardo, supra note 48, at 251; Pardo, supra note 66, at 597.
99
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criteria as a general matter. Rather, the salience and importance of each
will depend on details of the particular context and the inferential task
at hand.”107 They provide a theoretical alternative to the probabilistic
paradigm but little direction on how it should be applied in practice.
III
APPLIED LEGAL STORYTELLING AND RELEVANCY
Another powerful, though largely unacknowledged, contender to
oust the probabilistic paradigm has developed on parallel tracks to the
explanatory paradigm. Applied Legal Storytelling confirms many of
the insights of Peter Lipton, but offers—in contrast to the explanatory
paradigm—a way to apply those insights.
Though ALS scholars have long recognized the importance of
explanations in the presentation of a case, they have, up to now, made
no attempt to apply these insights to evidentiary rules. And, for that
matter, neither have evidence scholars, including Allen and Pardo,
looked to the insights of ALS scholarship in their debates with
proponents of the probabilistic conception over the model to use in
determining probative value.
A. Applied Legal Storytelling
Scholars in the field of ALS build on cognitive science research to
show how stories impact the decision-making process.108 At the first
symposium on the subject, Ruth Anne Robbins, a pioneer in the field,
noted,
Stories are essential ingredients in human interaction. According
to Jerome Bruner, . . . stories are instinctual, and we understand,
intuitively, how they work. Even though law is allegedly about
something other than stories, i.e. “logic” and “reasoning,” stories
nevertheless are there to guide the logic and reasoning. Ergo, it is
misguided for lawyers to be suspicious of stories as applied in law or
to try and mitigate their persuasive influence. Rather, stories or
narratives . . . are cognitive instruments and also means of
argumentation in and of themselves. Lawyers need to realize the
importance of story towards accomplishing the goals of legal
communication and legal persuasion.
....
. . . The goal of applied legal storytelling is to help lawyers serve their
clients through the use of story . . . . The best that we can do for our
107
108

Pardo, supra note 66, at 597–98.
See supra text accompanying notes 15–18.

186

OREGON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 99, 163

lawyers (I am including judges and professors in that category) is to
create a rich, and yet accessible, dialogue about how, why, and when
legal stories can be used in our profession.109

ALS scholars and those in the related field of law and literature are
the first to acknowledge that narrative does not meet the “threefold
demands of generality, unreflexivity, and reliability that are necessary
if a prevailing [legal] order is credibly to justify itself.”110 But they
also recognize that, unlike the abstracted rhetoric of the law, narrative
provides legal decision-makers a portal for fully understanding
particular situations or conditions through the lenses of their own
human experiences.111 Narrative also has the potential to
counterbalance logic-driven injustices:
[W]hatever may be the merits of a rights-based regime, one of the
dangers of a society that relies too heavily on [legal] rights and
insufficiently on narrative, is that it may be dangerously inattentive
to the very real need to assign and then acknowledge both individual
and societal responsibility for the consequences of actions.112

ALS scholarship is also keenly aware of the dismissive attitude of
many scholars and courts to the narrative project. In the minds of the
detractors, legal rules are “hard,” but storytelling is “soft.” As one
writer puts it,
[T]he law rarely speaks in a doctrinal or analytic way about its
narrative dimension. On the contrary, it seems to want to deny the
importance of story, to tame it by legal rule, to interrupt it by crossquestioning, to suppress it through the equation of story with the
emotional, the irrational, the dangerous wild card in a discourse
committed to reason and syllogism. The analytic tools of narratology,
including questions of point of view, voice, [and] implied audience,
. . . are almost never found in the law, even in those cases that seem
urgently to call for such attention.113

ALS scholars have also demonstrated how storytelling methods can
be applied in practice: in the negotiation of a dispute, in the
examination of a witness, in the crafting of a persuasive opening
statement and closing argument, and in the drafting of a brief, among

109

Robbins, supra note 14, at 4–5 (citations omitted).
Steven L. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon Between Legal Power and
Narrative Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2225, 2228 (1989).
111 Id.
112 ROBIN WEST, NARRATIVE, AUTHORITY AND LAW 427 (1993). (“[T]he causation
element of a tort claim is the element that ultimately assigns responsibility, and it typically
invites a story of doing so.”).
113 Peter Brooks, Literature as Law’s Other, 22 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 349, 360 (2010).
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other contexts.114 This scholarship has demonstrated how the tools of
narratology can be used to effectively present a case.
Many of ALS’s insights support the explanatory paradigm’s critique
of the probabilistic paradigm. Specifically, ALS literature contains rich
analyses of the role of explanatory facts in presenting a case and the
factors that affect the quality of different explanations. As one text in
the area suggests, lawyers need to consider that
[t]he context of each [incident in the case] does not include just the
physical setting of the event or the physical movements of the
participants. To assess fully what is happening in an episode, it is
often essential to consider the participants’ states of mind: the reasons
why each of them acted in the ways they did. Certain actions or
omissions, which may seem inconsistent with a party’s position in a
case, may appear to be reasonable once the explanations for these
actions are identified. On the other hand, the parties’ explanations
may seem quite feeble. Accordingly, as you review your [evidence],
it is helpful to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of these
explanations.115

B. Overlaps and Differences Between ALS and the
Explanatory Paradigm
While Allen and Pardo recognize the relationship between their
paradigm and Pennington and Hastie’s Story Model of jury decisionmaking, they argue that there are important differences between the two
and, in so doing, overlook the insights of the ALS literature.116 They
acknowledge that many of the criteria identified by Pennington and
Hastie that make a story persuasive (e.g., coverage, coherence, and
uniqueness) also make an explanation better, and vice versa.117 And
they point to the empirical findings underpinning the Story Model as
empirical evidence that the actual reasoning process used at trial
comports with the explanatory conception of proof rather than the
probability conception.118
114

See supra text accompanying note 16.
STEFAN H. KRIEGER ET AL., ESSENTIAL LAWYERING SKILLS 248 (6th ed. 2020)
(quoting DAVID A. BINDER & PAUL BERGMAN, FACT INVESTIGATION 140 (1984)
(emphasis added)).
116 Allen & Pardo, Relative Plausibility and Its Critics, supra note 82, at 7 n.7; Allen &
Pardo, Explanations and the Preponderance Standard, supra note 82, at 1583 n.23 (arguing
that the Story Model is “a psychological account of juror behavior and, unlike our account,
it does not provide an account of standards of proof and other aspects of the proof process”);
Pardo, supra note 66, at 598.
117 Pardo, supra note 66, at 598.
118 Id.
115
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But Allen and Pardo downplay the significance of storytelling,
contrasting their robust explanation of proof with the purely descriptive
Story Model.119 While they correctly note that Pennington and Hastie’s
studies were empirical, they overlook the fact that the field of ALS—
developed from those studies and other cognitive science research—
has been engaged in theoretical projects that in fact provide guidance
to lawyers and courts. And, as will be demonstrated, storytelling
research can be tremendously useful in assessing the relevancy of
evidence in light of the explanations proffered by parties.120
Pardo contends, for example, that the two models are different
because explanations, unlike stories, may be quite general. He argues
that while the Story Model focuses on specific stories, “the generality
of alternative explanations will depend on the substantive law and the
way in which parties attempt to prove their case.”121 This argument
both misconstrues the import of the Story Model research and ignores
the insights from his own analysis of the explanatory conception. While
Pennington and Hastie did limit the scope of their research to the effect
of a single “best” story on jury decision-making,122 they did not limit
their findings to the context of a party’s single overall narrative. Indeed,
scholars in ALS have recognized that the insights from cognitive
science studies show an interplay between alternative narratives, the
substantive law, and the parties’ competing theories of the case.123
Moreover, Pardo fails to acknowledge that some of the very factors he
identifies as forming the basis for the best explanations—mechanism,
precision, scope, fertility—militate in favor of specific explanations. In
other words, the factors represent mini-narratives. Lipton, upon whose
philosophical theory of Inference to the Best Explanation Allen and
Pardo rely, theorizes that people seek explanations that are precise,
broad in scope, and coherently make connections between individual
119

Id.; Allen & Pardo, Relative Plausibility and Its Critics, supra note 82, at 17 n.86.
See infra text accompanying notes 135–70.
121 Pardo, supra note 66, at 599.
122 Pennington & Hastie, supra note 12, at 552.
123 See, e.g., AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 81, at 287–88 (2000) (“To be sure,
results in the law are achieved by the application of specialized legal reasoning—reasoning
within and about doctrinal rules, procedural requirements, constitutional and other
jurisprudential theories—and are articulated almost wholly in those terms. But final results
are underdetermined by such rules, requirements, and theories. They are influenced as well
by how people think, categorize, tell stories, deploy rhetorics, and make cultural sense as
they go about interpreting and applying rules, requirements, and theories.”); ROBERT P.
BURNS, A THEORY OF THE TRIAL 36 (1999) (observing that in preparing a case for trial, a
lawyer creates a “double helix”: a strand of logical argument intertwined with a strand of
narrative).
120
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pieces of evidence.124 Those are the very aspects of good persuasive
storytelling, not general argumentation.
Pardo also argues for the primacy of explanations on the basis that
they can be disjunctive, in contrast to the integrated stories examined
by Pennington and Hastie. While he acknowledges that a party may
offer two inconsistent stories at trial, he asserts that they typically work
together as one explanation. In contrast, he contends that under the
explanatory paradigm, explanations may be disjunctive—they may be
inconsistent with each other.125
Despite Pardo’s contention, nothing in the Story Model—at least as
presented by ALS scholars—prohibits the presentation of inconsistent
stories. The Story Model recognizes that a party may present alternative
narratives in the presentation of its case. In a products liability case, for
example, the plaintiff may tell two stories: (1) that the defendant did
not exercise care in the production of a product, and (2) that the
product’s design was defective. A robust defense to a murder charge
might tell both the story that the police coerced a false confession from
the accused and the story that the alleged victim was behaving so
violently and erratically that whoever committed the homicide acted in
self-defense. While counsel might try to integrate these stories into an
overall narrative, nothing in the storytelling scholarship requires such
integration. It only suggests some degree of fit is required between the
two stories.126
Allen and Pardo’s downplaying of narrative ignores the similarities
between their own explanatory paradigm and the Story Model. They
argue, “[A] story such as a chronological narrative can provide an
explanation, but the story does not persuade independent of the
evidence at trial. It should be obvious that ‘telling a good story’ at trial
but failing to provide evidence of its truth is a recipe for disaster.”127
This argument, however, creates a straw person. Neither Pennington
and Hastie nor any credible scholar in the ALS field argues that telling
124

See supra text accompanying notes 100–05.
Pardo, supra note 66, at 599.
126 Obviously, alternative stories—like alternative explanations—can become so
inconsistent as to lack persuasive effect. See JANET MALCOLM, THE CRIME OF SHEILA
MCGOUGH 67 (1999) (“Trials are won by attorneys whose stories fit, and lost by those
whose stories are like the shapeless housecoat that truth, in her disdain for appearances, has
chosen as her uniform.”). On the other hand, if a story seems to fit too perfectly, the
audience, especially in the litigation context, might become a bit wary. AMSTERDAM &
BRUNER, supra note 81, at 174 (“The more a story told by a visibly good advocate hangs
together . . . the more susceptible it is to being taken as a clever concoction.”).
127 Allen & Pardo, Relative Plausibility and Its Critics, supra note 82, at 7 n.7.
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a story without presenting admissible evidence is either advisable or
effective. But Allen and Pardo’s language—“the story does not
persuade independent of the evidence”—ignores the fact that the
reverse proposition often is the case. As the ALS literature
demonstrates, evidence in a case may not persuade a fact finder unless
it tells a persuasive story.128
Obviously, as Allen and Pardo note, all explanations in the legal
context are not full-blown stories.129 But, as will be shown,130 the
factors they identify for assessing the plausibility of explanation—
consistency, coverage, completeness, simplicity, coherence, and fit
with background knowledge—are the very components that the Story
Model shows pervade effective storytelling. So while all plausible
explanations are not complete narratives, good explanations possess
many of the same qualities as good stories. And those are the narrative
qualities recognized by ALS scholarship. Allen and Pardo
acknowledge that stories may be one “cognitive tool” in determining
the existence and persuasiveness of plausible explanations,131 but they
never explore the import of that insight. Their explanatory paradigm
recognizes factors important for assessing probative value:
consideration of the Lipton factors on the quality of proffered
explanations given the evidence.132 But it provides no specific
direction to attorneys or courts on how to apply those factors in
practice. Allen and Pardo do not examine, for example, how an attorney
should effectively argue that a particular item of evidence has the
precision necessary to support her explanation of an issue in the case.
Nor do they consider how a trial judge, in ruling on the probative value

128 See, e.g., KRIEGER ET AL., supra note 115, at 207 (“A story does more than set out a
chronological series of events. It tries to make sense of those events.”); MALCOLM, supra
note 126, at 11 (describing how a defendant, herself a criminal defense lawyer, lost her case
because she “was not interested in telling a plausible and persuasive story [but] was out for
the bigger game of imparting a great number of accurate and numbingly boring facts” in
evidence).
129 Allen & Pardo, Relative Plausibility and Its Critics, supra note 82, at 27 (noting that
in the areas of antitrust litigation, no-fault divorces, and contract disputes, “[c]ompeting
explanations may be advanced . . . but not necessarily in the form of the normal meaning of
‘stories’”). As the scholarship in ALS demonstrates, however, even in some of these areas,
lawyers can use narrative techniques to present their cases. See, e.g., Susan M. Chesler &
Karen J. Sneddon, Once upon a Transaction: Narrative Techniques and Drafting, 68 OKLA.
L. REV. 263 (2016); Sneddon, supra note 17.
130 See infra text accompanying notes 135–70.
131 Allen & Pardo, Relative Plausibility and Its Critics, supra note 82, at 7 n.7.
132 See supra text accompanying notes 100–05.
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of that evidence, determines whether that item of evidence actually
adds precision to the party’s explanation.
C. Applying Storytelling Insights to Relevancy Decisions
While the explanatory paradigm provides a superior account to the
long-dominant probabilistic paradigm, it has limits. Though the rise of
the explanatory paradigm has provided grist for vibrant and sometimes
contentious academic debate,133 it has done little to directly affect
actual trial practice. And that is where the scholarship in ALS comes
in. The findings in that field can provide guidance to lawyers and
judges to apply the Lipton factors and flesh out their contours in
arguments and decisions.134
1. Storytelling and the Mechanism of an Explanation
The first quality of a best explanation identified by Lipton is the
mechanism of a situation or condition. While many legal theories,
especially in the area of torts,135 focus on causation, the best
explanations demonstrate in detail how causes operate.136 In other
words, an effective explanation addresses not only the events leading
up to the key action (e.g., the causes of the malpractice or breach of the
contract or the run-up to the execution of a will) but also how those
events actually played out. The ALS scholarship demonstrates that the
“mechanics” of a situation or condition are effectively shown by
evidence that assists the fact finder in visualizing the events leading up
to the particular situation or condition—in other words, evidence that
sets the scene. “Scene-setting takes its power from its ability to put [the
listeners] into the story, to let [the listeners] ride the narrative arc
[themselves].”137
133

See Allen & Pardo, Relative Plausibility and Its Critics, supra note 82.
See supra text accompanying notes 100–05.
135 See, e.g., 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND
EMOTIONAL HARM chs. 5–6 (Am. L. Inst. 2010).
136 LIPTON, supra note 97, at 122.
137 Steve Johansen & Ruth Anne Robbins, Art-iculating the Analysis: Systemizing the
Decision to Use Visuals as Legal Reasoning, 20 LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST.
57, 81 (2015); see also Nick Brown, Expert Storytelling & Storytelling Experts: Why You
Should Use Scientific Stories in the Courtroom, 5 HLRE: OFF REC. 157, 165 (2015) (in
discussing the examination of scientific experts at trial, author observes, “[scene-setting]
entails having the expert describe where the events and facts unfold as they progress. An
image yanks an idea from its platonic form into the real world. Imagery thus mentally
transports jurors into the story, making its ideas more accessible.”); Elizabeth Fajans &
Mary R. Falk, Untold Stories: Restoring Narrative to Pleading Practice, 15 LEGAL
WRITING:
134
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Such scene-setting can be created by evidence about the location of
the key event, the environment of the event, objects involved in the
situation or condition, and the presence of other people.138 In a hostile
work environment case, for example, evidence of the office layout, the
location of the employee’s and her supervisor’s offices, and the
presence of other employees during the discriminatory incidents all
might aid in understanding the mindsets of the parties and the overall
mechanics of the situation. Or in an automobile accident case, evidence
of the weather conditions, road terrain, direction of the road, the angle
of the sunlight, and distractions of the drivers may be important to an
understanding of each party’s explanation of the incident.139
Storytelling literature also shows the possible importance of
choreography in the scene in adding to the understanding of the
mechanics underlying the key action. “In any particular [situation], the
parties may move around, physically interact with other persons,
handle objects, have facial expressions, and speak with distinctive
intonations.”140 These physical movements and manifestations can
significantly impact a fact finder’s understanding of the explanations
proffered by the parties. In a murder case, for example, a defendant’s
self-defense claim may turn on the movements of the defendant and the
alleged victim, the tones of their voices, and the accessibility of any
weapons.

J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 3, 39 (2009) (noting that “‘A scene makes the past present.’ It lets
the [listener] see the event unfold . . . .”); Robert W. Gordon, Simpson’s Leading Cases,
95 MICH. L. REV. 2044, 2045 (1997) (reviewing A.W. BRIAN SIMPSON, LEADING CASES IN
THE COMMON LAW (1995)) (“There doesn’t have to be a ‘point’ to a good narrative save
that of setting the scene, reconstructing the smell and feel of the situation as contemporaries
lived it.”); Albert J. Moore, Inferential Streams: The Articulation and Illustration of the
Trial Advocate’s Evidentiary Intuitions, 34 UCLA L. REV. 611, 624–25 (1987) (arguing that
scene-setting evidence is necessary to make the oral story being told more clear, more vivid,
and more easily understood and remembered).
138 See, e.g., KRIEGER ET AL., supra note 115, at 246–48; Fajans & Falk, supra note 137,
at 39–40.
139 KRIEGER ET AL., supra note 115, at 247; see also Fajans & Falk, supra note 137, at
39–40 (in the pleadings context, discussing the facts necessary to allege to set the scene for
involuntary servitude and slip-and-fall cases); James Parry Eyster, Lawyer as Artist: Using
Significant Moments and Obtuse Objects to Enhance Advocacy, 14 LEGAL WRITING:
J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 87, 102–14 (2008) (telling the story about an immigration case
concerning the validity of a marriage between an immigrant and an American citizen in
which the immigration judge was only convinced the couple was in fact married after the
wife’s sudden burst of anger at her husband’s failure to put down the toilet seat after use).
140 KRIEGER ET AL., supra note 115, at 248.
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2. Storytelling and the Precision of an Explanation
Lipton also contends that the precision of an explanation adds to its
plausibility.141 The quantitative elements of an explanation, he asserts,
may be as important as its qualitative aspects.142 This factor is
consistent with evidentiary rules, which prefer the more concrete
depiction of a situation or condition over an abstract description.143
ALS research suggests that the precision of an explanation can be
enhanced by the use of evidence that is particularly detailed as to
measurement, quantity, and proportion. For example, a witness who
observed a nighttime robbery might truthfully testify that the scene of
the crime was brightly lit. Without preparation, however, he would be
unlikely to focus on the details of the street lighting: How far was the
nearest lamppost? In what direction? How tall was it? Was it blocked
by trees or billboards? Did it have one of the newer, high-intensity
lamps? And there can be more to lighting than streetlamps: Were there
stores nearby? Did they have exterior signs? Did any of the adjacent
houses have outside lights? Where? How many? How far?144 Such
evidence can add to the credibility of a witness’s testimony and her
explanations of her actions.145 Moreover, such detailed evidence can
also help to convince a fact finder that a witness has a particularly good
memory of the events and emphasize the emotional impact of the
events.146
The storytelling literature also demonstrates that precise detail
can be used to facilitate the fact finder’s visualization of the case.
The amount of detail provided to connect the structural elements of
a story—scene, act, agent, agency, and purpose—has been found to
have a significant bearing on the fact finder’s judgments of the
persuasiveness of a party’s story.147
Similarly, this literature reveals how precision can enhance
explanations by bringing the fact finder closer to a party. By zooming
141

LIPTON, supra note 97, at 122.
Id.
143 BROUN ET AL., supra note 45, at 30.
144 Steven Lubet, Persuasion at Trial, 21 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 325, 341–42 (1997).
145 See KRIEGER ET AL., supra note 115, at 245.
146 DAVID A. BINDER & PAUL BERGMAN, FACT INVESTIGATION 142 (1984); see
Stephen A. Newman, Discussing Advocacy Skills in Traditional Doctrinal Courses, 65
J. LEGAL EDUC. 207, 213 (2015) (asserting that the recitation of details in an opinion in an
automobile accident case “puts the plaintiff, Ms. Dunphy, in a very sympathetic light, and
gives the reader a grasp on the profound emotional impact of the event on her”).
147 BENNETT & FELDMAN, supra note 12, at 89.
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in on the actions and feelings of an individual at the key event in a case,
a lawyer can focus the fact finder on the viewpoint of that person and
create empathy for him.148 On the other hand, recitation of precise
details that fail to connect the pieces or make a point might actually
harm the case. As Janet Malcolm observes in regard to legal
storytelling, “The person who insists on speaking the whole truth, who
painfully spells out every last detail of an action and interrupts his wife
to say it was Tuesday, not Wednesday . . . is not honored for his honesty
but is shunned for his tiresomeness.”149
3. Storytelling and Scope of an Explanation
An explanation is the loveliest, Lipton posits, when it explains more
phenomena than the key event. While the “mechanics” of a situation or
condition assist the fact finder in understanding the environment of and
actions leading up to the key event, and while precision provides details
for that context, scope looks beyond the key event. In the context of the
evidence rules, the scope factor is concerned with whether an
explanation of a party’s conduct in the key event is consistent with the
overall character of that party and other events in the case. In regard to
the character of the parties, ALS scholars recognize the importance of
“personal facts,” which help to explain the actions of the different
parties. These facts are “observable characteristics—such as physical
attributes and dress; personality; attitude . . . ; and personal background
including economic status, educational status, job status, family status,
residence, and previous similar involvements.”150 These personal facts
provide the fact finder with a richer understanding of the parties in a
case by showing how they generally behave and react in similar

148 Cathren Koehlert-Page, Come a Little Closer So I Can See You My Pretty: The Use
and Limits of Fiction Techniques for Establishing an Empathetic Point of View in Appellate
Briefs, 80 UMKC L. REV. 399, 415 (2011) (describing how an amicus brief in Michigan v.
Bryant, 562 U.S. 344 (2011), by giving a detailed description of the victim’s death, created
empathy for him).
149 MALCOLM, supra note 126, at 4.
150 BINDER & BERGMAN, supra note 146, at 107; FED. R. EVID. 404 provides categorical
restraints on the admission of such general character evidence to establish propensity
because “in many situations the probative value is slight and the potential for prejudice
large.” BROUN ET AL., supra note 45, at 401. While it is beyond the scope of this Article to
delve into the validity of such a hard-and-fast rule in terms of the explanatory paradigm or
storytelling theory, it should be noted that the cases often do not distinguish between
character evidence to show propensity and character evidence to assist the fact finder in
understanding the context of a party’s actions. See infra text accompanying notes 178–80.
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situations.151 While some judges might hold that such evidence “plays
on the sympathy of the jurors,” it actually has probative value because
it assists the jury in deciding the issues in the case by providing a
broader context for assessing the differing explanations of the parties.
In a similar vein, storytelling research shows that evidence of the
participant’s state of mind is often important to an understanding of the
key actions in a case.152 Take the case of an assault: The defendant
brutally beats a restaurant worker—a total stranger—seemingly
unprovoked. The defendant is arrested on site, so there is no doubt as
to identity. The prosecution might present evidence that the defendant
had stormed off after a dispute over the bill earlier the same day or,
perhaps, that the worker resembled an ex-spouse of the defendant.
Defense counsel, arguing that her client was insane at the time of the
attack, might elicit evidence that her client was diagnosed with
schizophrenia and had run out of medications that morning. Some
facts—for example, that the defendant had allegedly been called a slur
during the earlier incident—might be used by both parties. While some
of this evidence may in fact play to the sympathy of the jury, it also
provides necessary context for what could be considered a random act
of violence.
And in regard to consistency of events, David Binder and Paul
Bergman have noted that, “[b]ased on common experience, most of us
believe that events proceed in recognizable patterns and that people’s
emotional states and actions remain relatively consistent from one
moment to the next. Therefore, when the different parts of the story are
in harmony, we tend to trust the story.”153 Accordingly, even if
evidence has only a tangential connection with an element of the case
151 KRIEGER ET AL., supra note 115, at 249; David Dante Troutt, Screws, Koon, and
Routine Aberrations: The Use of Fictional Narratives in Federal Police Brutality
Prosecutions, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 18, 69 (1999).
152 KRIEGER ET AL., supra note 115, at 428; Jonathan K. Van Patten, Storytelling for
Lawyers, 57 S.D. L. REV. 239, 265 (2012) (“In describing the characters in the story, the
focus . . . [should be on] the description of [a party’s] thoughts. . . . The thoughts and
emotions of the [party] have an immediacy that invites the audience to share in those
thoughts and feelings.”).
153 BINDER & BERGMAN, supra note 146, at 138; see Ronald J. Allen, Factual Ambiguity
and a Theory of Evidence, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 604, 618 (1994) (“[E]vidence is obviously
contingent in the sense that the implications of any particular [item of evidence] is a function
of other [items of evidence] relevant to the case.”); E-mail from Ronald J. Allen to Jonathan
Krieger (June 18, 2020) (on file with author) (“A person is charged with murder, and a
witness testified he was seen driving in the area around the time of the murder—inculpatory.
Then another witness testifies that he always visits his aged mother at exactly that time in
that neighborhood—exculpatory.”).
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or the credibility of a witness, it may have probative value under the
explanatory conception if it shows a pattern of conduct for a particular
party consistent with an explanation. If, for example, the defendant in
the Johnson case explains his anger at the nonreceipt of the package as
motivated by his deep feelings for his family, evidence of other
instances demonstrating his close relationship with his family would be
probative.154
4. Storytelling and Simplicity of an Explanation
The fourth Lipton attribute to consider in assessing an explanation
is simplicity. A simple explanation “reveal[s] the unity that underlies
the apparent diversity of the phenomena.”155 In the context of the
evidence rules, “the apparent diversity” of the contested situation or
condition in a case is usually a given. The parties present conflicting
evidence as to what really happened, and the fact finder is left to make
a decision based on the competing explanations of this evidence. Under
Lipton’s formulation and the explanatory model of proof, then, an item
of evidence has probative value the more it supports a unifying
explanation of all the evidence.
The ALS research on unifying themes in storytelling provides
helpful guidance in making this assessment of probative value of
particular evidence. A unifying theme is the controlling idea or core
insight of a story. It provokes a fact finder to have a particular view of
the case.156 It establishes a “thread of common meaning that runs
through[out the entire case].”157
While this literature provides practitioners with advice as to how to
develop a unifying theme,158 those insights can also assist judges in
deciding whether evidence that might otherwise be considered
irrelevant under the probabilistic model helps explain the party’s
version of its story. A persuasive theme for a plaintiff, the research
reveals, is the particular injustice suffered by the party.159 Consider, for

154

See supra text accompanying notes 87–95.
LIPTON, supra note 97, at 122.
156 PHILIP N. MEYER, STORYTELLING FOR LAWYERS 16 (2014).
157 JANICE SCHUETZ & KATHRYN HOLMES SNEDAKER, COMMUNICATION AND
LITIGATION: CASE STUDIES OF FAMOUS TRIALS 80 (1988). As one skills text suggests, a
lawyer “[i]n a single tweet, [should] state the central meaning of [her] client’s case.”
KRIEGER ET AL., supra note 115, at 214.
158 KRIEGER ET AL., supra note 115, at 213–18.
159 See EDMOND N. CAHN, THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE: AN ANTHROPOCENTRIC VIEW OF
LAW 13–14 (1949) (arguing that “the response to a real or imagined instance of injustice . . .
155
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example, in the police abuse case discussed in the Introduction that the
plaintiff offers the theme that the officers disregarded their training in
using excessive force.160 Evidence of the police department’s use-offorce rules, the officers’ willful indifference as the plaintiff cried in
pain, the plaintiff’s lack of resistance, and the officers’ failure to attend
to the plaintiff’s injury together create a simple picture of that theme.
The storytelling studies also recognize how persuasive themes can
be crafted from refrains that recur throughout the events in a case. Even
patterns of ostensibly minor errors or problems can, when viewed in
the aggregate, appear quite significant.161 When minor mistakes or
lapses repeat themselves, “a feeling of suspicion [may] begin[] to arise
and, finally, one of antipathy toward the person who appears to be . . .
trying to get away with something.”162 In a breach of warranty of
habitability case, for example, in which the plaintiff alleges serious
structural problems with the dwelling, evidence of the landlord’s
failure to make fairly minor repairs may have probative value to
support a theme of wanton neglect.
“Trouble” is another possible unifying theme identified by the
storytelling scholarship. Many cases concern a party who strives to
attain a goal but runs into trouble. An explanation of that trouble is only
persuasive to a fact finder if it believes that the trouble is a deviation
from the usual state of affairs. The unifying theme in such a case will
probably center on this deviation. Otherwise, the troublesome situation
seems incomprehensible.163 That is precisely Lipton’s point in
identifying simplicity as a factor underlying best explanations. In a
criminal case against an inmate for injuring another prisoner, for
example, a defendant’s self-defense explanation for his conduct will be
most persuasive if he can present evidence showing he has an
exemplary disciplinary record as compared with the victim’s.
5. Storytelling and the Fertility of an Explanation
According to Lipton, an explanation is lovely if it leads to a clearer
understanding of a situation or condition because it “disclose[s] . . .
previously unnoted relationships among those already known.”164
is alive with movement and warmth”); James W. McElhaney, Opening Statements: To Be
Effective with the Jury, Tell a Good Story, 81 A.B.A. J. 73, 74 (1995).
160 See supra text accompanying notes 1–6.
161 KRIEGER ET AL., supra note 115, at 216 n.20.
162 MALCOLM, supra note 126, at 121.
163 See AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 81, at 46.
164 LIPTON, supra note 97, at 122.
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Applying this rule in the trial context, evidence is more probative to the
extent that it fits together with evidence that has already been
established. As Lipton acknowledges, this fifth factor—fertility or
fruitfulness—raises issues similar to those raised by the other factors
of scope (the character of the parties and consistency of events) and
simplicity (unifying theme). But it adds another element: the cohesion
of all the evidence underlying the explanation.
Substantial ALS scholarship addresses the issue of cohesion in
storytelling. Studies have shown that the higher the frequency of
ambiguities in a story, the more difficult it will be for the fact finder to
interpret it.165 Chris Rideout, a scholar who has focused extensively on
this issue, has observed,
When we think of a set of events as a story, as something more than
just a collection of discrete actions, then internal narrative coherence
is a part of our thinking. The actions must fit together in a sequential
arrangement that accords with our sense of causation and that is
internally consistent.166

Faced with competing stories, “[fact finders] are influenced by the story
that seems most probable, and the story that is presented most
coherently will also be the story that seems most probable.”167
By the same token, then, under the explanatory model of proof,
evidence that supports a coherent explanation of a party’s version of
the events is quite probative. The impact of a precise portrayal of the
setting, the characters, their motivations, and their step-by-step
actions—that all fit together—can be more persuasive in explaining a
party’s story than limited evidence as to the key event in the case. The
whole becomes more than the sum of its parts. So again, evidence that
might seem only marginally relevant to an element of the case might in
fact be considered probative if it plays a role in connecting the different
pieces of evidence supporting a party’s explanation or clears up any
ambiguities in the case.
6. Storytelling and Background Belief
Lipton’s final factor for assessing the quality of an explanation—fit
with background belief—is consistent with the findings of cognitive
scientists and ALS scholars.
165

BENNETT & FELDMAN, supra note 12, at 68–90.
J. Christopher Rideout, A Twice-Told Tale: Plausibility and Narrative Coherence in
Judicial Storytelling, 10 LEGAL COMMC’N & RHETORIC: JAWLD 67, 75 (2013).
167 J. Christopher Rideout, Storytelling, Narrative Rationality, and Legal Persuasion,
14 LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 53, 64 (2008).
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Different fact-finders are capable of giving different meanings to
the telling of the very same story. In one study of a simulated jury
trial, for example, jurors in one case constructed radically different
stories from the same presentation of evidence in one case. The case
concerned the theft of property that the defendant asserted he thought
was abandoned. Some jurors concluded that the defendant unlawfully
stole the property, while others thought it was the mistake of a wellintentioned, ignorant man who had no sense of what he was stealing.
Some saw the situation as the act of a “Good Samaritan” cleaning
up the neighborhood, while others viewed it as the commission
of the perfect, plotted crime, carried out “in broad daylight” to
make the act appear innocent. From 48 groups of jurors viewing the
very same video-taped trial, 15 different versions of the story were
constructed.168

Accordingly, an explanation that might be the best for one set of fact
finders might not be that lovely for another.
But, in terms of the issues of proof addressed in this Article, the ALS
scholarship does more than simply confirm Lipton’s insights. If, as
posited by Lipton, explanations are viewed differently depending on
the audience, then in some cases the probative value of evidence
supporting an explanation may vary depending on the nature of the fact
finder. Accordingly, under the explanatory conception, a judge, in
assessing the probative value of evidence may need to consider,
depending upon the context of the case, the composition of the jury.
Recent studies in the area of linguistics and communications theory
have shown that the most important part of fitting a story to the
audience members is not “buttering them up” but entering into a
dialogue with them attempting to address the particular concerns in
their minds.169 Lawyer-storytellers, then, are most effective if they
understand the reasoning process that the fact finder will use in making
sense of the evidence at trial.170
Applying these insights to the issue of proof under the explanatory
model, the judge may need to assess the probative value of a particular
item of evidence under the lens of the possible social and cultural biases
the jury might be bringing to the case. Boilerplate jury instructions to
not allow those biases to interfere with decision-making might have
only limited effect. But evidence directly addressing the biases of a
particular jury might be quite effective. For instance, in the above
hypothetical concerning the theft of property that the defendant
168 KRIEGER ET AL., supra note 115, at 210 (citing James A. Holstein, Jurors’
Interpretations and Jury Decision Making, 9 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 83, 86–90 (1985)).
169 AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 81, at 136.
170 KRIEGER ET AL., supra note 115, at 211 n.10.
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explains he thought was abandoned, if the defendant is a person of color
and the all-white jury is from a suburb plagued with thefts, evidence of
the defendant’s steady work history may have substantial probative
value and prevent misconceived biases from interfering with the jury’s
decision.
***
As fleshed out by the insights of the ALS scholarship, it is clear that
the explanatory paradigm supports the notion that parties should be
allowed to have their witnesses tell their stories at trial. Those stories
consist not just of the bare facts concerning the key events in the case
but the context for those events. The contextual facts—the surrounding
environment, the choreography of the parties’ actions, the precise
details of those actions, the character of the parties, the existence of a
unifying theme, and the consistency and cohesion of the evidence—are
essential under the explanatory conception to a full understanding of
the explanations proffered by the parties. As Lipton’s philosophical
theory and cognitive science research demonstrate, without those
contextual facts, fact finders are unable to adequately assess the
competing explanations presented by the parties.
IV
RECONCILING RULE 401 AND NARRATIVE-BASED ADMISSIBILITY
Thus, in a surprising way, the explanatory paradigm, as viewed
through the lens of ALS, actually has similarities to the common law
method of witness examination. As shown above,171 prior to the late
nineteenth century, the preferred method of testimony was to allow
witnesses to give detailed versions of their own stories without the
interference of multiple attorney questions. Witnesses, unconstrained
by the requirement of piecemeal presentation of facts, most likely
provided many of the contextual facts necessary to their narrative.
Unfortunately, with the widespread adoption of technical rules for
witness examination, this prior mode for presenting testimony was
severely limited, and, in the words of Wigmore, this “natural method”
of witness storytelling was abandoned.172
171

See supra text accompanying notes 20–32.
2 WIGMORE, supra note 8, at 49. Obviously, witness storytelling did not guarantee
the presentation of all the contextual facts necessary to support a party’s explanations. Some
individuals are natural storytellers whose narratives are rich in detail; others are more
reticent about providing details. The point is not that the common law favored witness
storytelling as a value unto itself but that its approach toward witness storytelling reflected
its interest in the presentation of a full picture of the story of the case, not simply a limited
172
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But what of the language of the Federal Rules that defines probative
value as whether evidence “has any tendency to make a fact more or
less probable than it would be without the evidence”? At first glance,
this language—which focuses on the probability of evidence to support
the likelihood of a fact—appears to support the probabilistic model for
assessing probative value. But a closer reading of the rule discloses that
the drafters rejected a strict logical approach to evaluating probative
value. As shown above, the Model Code and Uniform Rules defined
probative value as evidence having a “tendency in reason” to prove a
fact.173 In contrast, the Federal Rules’ definition only requires a
showing of a “tendency” to prove a fact. As the Advisory Committee
notes show, this change was deliberate. The committee noted that the
language of the Uniform Rules perhaps unduly “emphasiz[es] . . . the
logical process and ignor[es] the need to draw upon experience or
science to validate the general principle upon which relevancy in a
particular situation depends.”174
The comments of Edward Cleary, the Advisory Committee’s
reporter, on his first draft of the rules presented to the committee in
April 1966 expansively set forth the rationale for the rejection of the
“tendency in reason” language from the Uniform Rules. Unlike formal
syllogistic reasoning, Cleary observed, in evidence law, the validity of
the major premise is not based on logic.
[T]he validity of the major premise depends upon the existence of a
pattern of human behavior, a matter perhaps determinable by
observation or experiment, but certainly not by any exercise of
logic. . . . To speak of relevancy as a matter of logic is . . . a
misleading partial statement: relevancy is the product of logic
applied to a generalization the validity of which must be established
from non-logical sources.
In examining the validity of the [major] premise, experience or
perhaps some inner quality which we can only label “common
sense,” [comes into play].175

Similarly, as demonstrated above,176 the drafters of the Federal Rules
recognized that “[e]vidence which is essentially background in nature
can scarcely be said to involve disputed matter, yet it is universally

presentation of discrete facts in support of particular legal propositions. In this way, the
common law mode of proof is similar to the explanatory conception.
173 See supra text accompanying note 38.
174 FED. R. EVID. 401 advisory committee’s note.
175 First Draft, supra note 55, at 3 (emphasis added).
176 See supra text accompanying notes 56–58.
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offered and admitted as an aid to understanding.”177 Such
“background” evidence, admitted as an aid to the jury’s understanding
of the case, is essentially the kind of evidence envisioned by the
explanatory paradigm.
The Advisory Committee’s rejection of the “tendency in reason”
language and its recognition of the relevancy of background evidence
reflect a strong preference for commonsense explanations over a purely
logical approach to relevancy decisions. Indeed, like the earlier
common law cases, the Advisory Committee seemed keenly aware of
the significance of narrative in the presentation of evidence.
And despite the development of technical rules of witness
examination and some scholars’ distrust of such background evidence,
many courts—especially at the state level—have been quite receptive
to the admission of such evidence. Courts, for example, have freely
admitted evidence of a party’s education and military background.178
Other courts have approved the admission of specific details about a
party’s personal life.179 And still others have observed that as a general
proposition “[i]t is not improper . . . to elicit background information
from a witness.”180
Unfortunately, however, like the conclusory language of the
Advisory Committee, the caselaw provides little guidance for assessing
the probative value of background evidence. Following in the footsteps
of its predecessor, the New Wigmore treatise approvingly refers to this
177

FED. R. EVID. 401 advisory committee’s note.
See, e.g., United States v. Blackwell, 853 F.2d 86, 88 (2d Cir. 1988) (“[T]estimony
concerning [a witness’s] service in the Marine Corps and his completion of two years of
college [may] properly [be] received as background” because “[i]t [tells] the jury something
about the [witness] as a person, and his experience in life.”); Wilcox v. Coons, 241 S.W.2d
907, 915 (Mo. 1951) (“It is entirely proper . . . to inquire into [a witness’s] residence,
antecedents, social connections and occupation, particularly as they reflect his credibility
either for good or bad.”).
179 See, e.g., State v. Sports, 255 S.E.2d 631, 633 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that
testimony regarding a witness’s “orphan status, epileptic history, scholarship assistance and
summer employment” “was relevant . . . as an explanation as to why the witness was
working at McDonald’s, living with her aunt in Greensboro, and walking home alone on the
night in question”); Ga. S. & F. Ry. Co. v. Ransom, 63 S.E. 525, 527 (Ga. Ct. App. 1909)
(“Who a witness is, his age, his business, whether a married man or otherwise are relevant
facts on the question of his credibility . . . .”).
180 United States v. Croft, 124 F.3d 1109, 1120 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing State v. Hussey,
521 A.2d 278, 281 (Me. 1987)); see also McDaniel v. Commonwealth, 415 S.W.3d 643,
654 (Ky. 2013) (“[B]ackground information is relevant to jurors in that it aids in assessing
the credibility of fact witnesses and in determining the weight to give their testimony . . . .”);
Williams v. State, 604 S.W.2d 146, 149 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (“It is well settled that a
party may place a witness in the context of his background . . . .”).
178
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Advisory Committee note about background evidence but observes
that “[t]he jurisprudence of ‘background evidence’” is “essentially
undeveloped.”181 The scholarship on the explanatory paradigm
regrettably offers little direction on this issue. The ALS research
described in this Article, however, provides important guidance for the
development of such a jurisprudence. But a caveat is in order: the best
or loveliest explanation might sometimes be one that reflects the biases
of the court (as the gatekeeper which assesses probative value) or the
jury. Of course, a judge might say, a defendant’s prior burglary would
be relevant to the current charge of breaking into a car. A victim’s
residence in a poor neighborhood could be used to blame the victim for
a crime or, more likely, to make the prosecution a referendum on
crime.182 From the experience of the authors, it is not rare to see
prosecutors, all rich or at least middle-class lawyers, act as if a city’s
horrific murder rate can be solved (and poor neighborhoods saved) by
a guilty conviction and an inevitable long prison term. These
prosecutors would gladly welcome a jurisprudence that admitted
extensive contextual evidence about the deficiencies of the defendant
and the merits of the alleged victim. Lipton’s factors for assessing the
best, or loveliest, explanation do not straightforwardly account for
these kinds of biases. The scope factor, for example, might arguably
encourage resort to these kinds of biases.
But there are two constraints on the wholesale admission of such
evidence. First, under the explanatory paradigm, the fact that one of the
Lipton factors adds to the quality of an explanation does not
automatically guarantee its admission. The court still needs to assess
the probative value of evidence in terms of these factors. And that is
where the ALS scholarship can provide much guidance. If, for
example, a party proffers evidence of marginal probative value to an
element of the case to show evidence of the fertility of the story, the
court can consider whether the evidence actually contributes to the
coherence of the narrative or is in fact just surplusage. Second,
standards such as Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provide a limitation to
the unfettered admission of explanatory evidence. Rule 403 bars
admission of testimony when the probative value is substantially
outweighed by factors such as unfair prejudice, confusion, undue delay,
181 ROGER PARK ET AL., THE NEW WIGMORE. A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE:
IMPEACHMENT AND REHABILITATION § 9.1 (2012).
182 Early cases reflect certain class biases by allowing witnesses to be attacked for
“drift[ing] about in idleness from place to place, associating with the low and vicious . . . .”
See, e.g., Hollingsworth v. State, 14 S.W. 41, 42 (Ark. 1890).
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or waste of time.183 The issue then becomes whether the probative
value of the evidence in enhancing the explanation of a party’s story is
substantially outweighed by these factors. In fact, the Supreme Court
has provided guidance for assessing prejudice from admission of
contextual evidence. In Old Chief v. United States,184 the Court
addressed how evidence of a prior conviction should be admitted at
trial for a recidivist gun charge. The prosecution, of course, wanted to
get into the gory details of the defendant’s prior offense. The defense
wanted to minimize these details and offered to stipulate to the fact the
defendant had been convicted of a felony.
In striking pro-storytelling language, the Court recognized the lost
oomph in the prosecution’s case caused by a stipulation. It observed
that such “[e]vidence . . . has force beyond any linear scheme of
reasoning, and as its pieces come together a narrative gains momentum,
with power not only to support conclusions but to sustain the
willingness of jurors to draw the inferences . . . necessary to reach an
honest verdict.”185 It also found the prosecution “need[ed] evidentiary
depth to tell a continuous story . . . .”186 The Court found, however, that
the prior convictions at issue added little to the story. Without referring
to the Lipton “fertility” factor, but while using it, the Court held that
the proffered evidence should not be admitted. It focused on the
coherency issue and held that an earlier chronology was unnecessary
because it would “leave[] no gap in the story of a defendant’s
subsequent criminality” and would not “displace[] a chapter from a
continuous sequence of conventional evidence . . . .”187 Finding little
probative value in the evidence, the Court concluded that the prejudice
substantially outweighed the probative value.
CONCLUSION
From the early days of common law trials to Wigmore to the drafting
of the Federal Rules of Evidence to Old Chief v. United States, courts
and scholars have recognized that narrative context is an essential part
of the fact-finding process. Allen and Pardo’s explanatory paradigm
fits into this conception of legal decision-making. But throughout this
history, there have also been prominent voices—like the critics of the
183
184
185
186
187

FED. R. EVID. 403.
Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997).
Id. at 187.
Id. at 190.
Id. at 191.
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Advisory Committee’s approach to background evidence and the
proponents of the probabilistic paradigm—who view fact-finding
primarily as an algorithmic process.
Cognitive science studies of legal decision-making and
philosophical theories such as Lipton’s have demonstrated that the
narrative mode is a natural part of human reasoning and cannot be
ignored. They do not belittle the logical-scientific mode of thought in
legal decision-making, but they caution against a rigid adherence to a
formulaic approach to issues such as relevancy. In most cases that
proceed to trial, the evidence will be incomplete, and, as Allen and
Pardo show, the jury will be left to sort out competing explanations of
the evidence presented. A proof system that views the evidence through
the lenses of legal elements and ignores contextual evidence simply
disregards the important role that such evidence plays in the ultimate
verdict.
But while the explanatory paradigm gives some guidance as to the
approach courts should take in deciding proof issues, it only goes so
far, providing little direction as to the operation of that conception in
practice. As this Article has shown, ALS scholarship provides
normative guidance for the development of a rich jurisprudence for
assessing the probative value of evidence in relation to the explanations
proffered by the parties.
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